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2Export Channel Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis of Changes in the
Organization of Foreign Distribution
Abstract. In this paper we use longitudinal data from a sample of Danish exporters in order to
investigate the dynamics of export organization. Building on previous research, we model
such decisions as an interplay between various switch inducing (motivators) as well as switch
impeding (costs) factors.  We extend previous analyses by looking simultaneously at both
replacements of foreign intermediaries (within-mode shifts) and integration of the sales
function abroad (between-mode shifts).
I. Introduction
Whenever a company wants to start exporting to a foreign market, decisions must be made as
to how its sales activities in that market should be carried out and by whom. First, the
exporting firm has two main alternatives; either it can perform the sales activities itself
(through its home- or foreign-based salespeople), or it can entrust another company – a sales
agent or a merchant distributor – to take care of its sales in the foreign market. For the
exporting company this is a strategic decision of considerable importance. The exporter must
recognize that the two alternatives differ considerably along several dimensions, particularly
with respect to the levels of control, resource commitment, and risk. In turn, the revenues as
well as the costs of foreign sales will also be affected (Luostarinen and Welch, 1990). Second,
if the exporter has chosen to externalize its sales activities in the foreign market, it has to
decide whom it will assign as its local representative. Sometimes this choice is an easy one if
one local intermediary stands out among the rest in terms of superior marketing capabilities
and, moreover, the outstanding intermediary is interested in carrying the lines of the exporting
firm. More often, however, the selection process is fraught with uncertainty and fortuitous
searching efforts (Munro and Beamish, 1987; Calof, 1993).
Once a decision has been reached and the company starts deploying resources to a
particular course of action, the chosen way of operating in the foreign market may over time
become increasingly difficult and costly to change (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987). Such
decisions are therefore likely to be given thoughtful consideration by top management.
Even though the choices of foreign entry modes and of the identity of the foreign
intermediary are likely to be “sticky”, they are nevertheless clearly not irreversible (Benito et
al., 1999). Some studies indicate that, over time, companies do in fact change the ways their
sales activities in foreign markets are organized (e.g. Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975;
Calof, 1993; Pedersen et al., 1997). Many companies start with export sales through
intermediaries (i.e. agents or distributors). Sometimes they decide later on to establish their
own foreign sales subsidiaries. The literature on firms’ internationalization suggests a number
of reasons why such conversions may take place: inter alia, reduced perceived risk of
operating abroad, increased sales volume in the foreign market, dissatisfaction with current
operations, and a larger company resource base (see e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977;
Nicholas, 1986; Calof, 1993; Calof and Beamish, 1995; Madhok, 1997).
In some other instances, companies may want to continue with an intermediary
arrangement, such as using an agent, as the way of serving a particular foreign market
(Petersen et al., 1998). However, being disappointed with the performance of their current
intermediary, and/or having identified other intermediaries with the potential for better
performance, firms may consider replacing their current intermediary with another one. Such
3changes are not trivial. Even though replacing an intermediary could seem to be somewhat
less drastic than actually integrating the sales function in a foreign market, such changes can
be costly to make. Contractual restrictions such as severance payment, difficulties in finding
new intermediaries, and potential loss of sales add up to making the switch from one
intermediary to another into a decision that needs to be carefully analyzed.
How often do companies switch from one intermediary to another or from one
operation method to another? What induces such changes, and what impedes them? Only a
handful of studies have looked into the dynamics of export organization (Pedersen et al.,
1997; Petersen et al., 1998). These questions therefore remain largely unanswered.
   In this paper, we use longitudinal data from a sample of Danish exporters in order to
investigate the dynamics of export organization. Our approach builds on previous studies by
Benito et al. (1999), Pedersen et al. (1997) and Petersen et al. (1998), who modeled such
decisions as an interplay between various switch inducing (motivators) and switch impeding
(deterrents/costs) factors. However, whereas previous studies focused either on changes of
entry mode (i.e. switching from using agents to establishing own sales subsidiaries) or,
alternatively, on replacements of intermediaries, in the present paper we look at both possible
options simultaneously. As mentioned earlier, whenever an exporting firm considers changing
its current practice in a foreign market, it can do so in two basically different ways; either by
integrating the sales function in the foreign market or by replacing its current intermediary.
The two alternatives are usually mutually exclusive1, and because it seems reasonable to
expect that firms do not, generally, have preconceived opinions about which one they ought to
choose, they are also real alternatives available to a firm. Hence, a model that includes both
options provides a more realistic treatment of the decisions firms may make regarding their
organization of foreign distribution. This study therefore represents an improvement over
previous analyses.
II. Modeling changes in foreign distribution
How can changes in foreign market servicing methods be modeled? Let us assume that at a
given point in time t, all of a set of companies exporting to a foreign market used
intermediaries as their means of selling to that market. Over time this may change. For
example, during a certain time interval, say t to t + ∆t, while many companies may have
chosen not to make any changes on how they service the market, other companies may have
carried out changes. The event y0 of whether or not a change has been made is defined as,
 1 if a change has been made,
y0 = 
 0 otherwise.
It should be noted that since a company cannot simultaneously decide both to carry
out changes and not to make any changes, these events are mutually exclusive. Hence, p (y0 =
1) = 1 – p (y0 = 0). Of course, even those companies that have not made any changes over a
given time interval may decide to change at a later point. The issue is simply that their initial
state persisted over the time interval under observation. Generally, the probability that the
initial state (i.e. the use of an intermediary) “survived” for a period of time T is specified as:
                                                          
1 The alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive since one can think of, supposedly rare, situations
where a firm appoints a new intermediary and, at the same occasion, internalizes some marketing
responsibilities,  thereby establishing a dual distribution system.
4(1) Pr [ t  ≤ T ≤ t + ∆t | T ≥ t ]
Given that a company does make a change, these can – as noted above – basically be
of two types; either the company replaces its current intermediary with another intermediary,
or the company switches to in-house sales activities (i.e. vertical integration). Hence, if y0 = 1,
a further set of events y1 must also take place, defined as follows:
 1 if switch to in-house operations,
y1 = 
 0 if intermediary at time t is replaced.
In principle, changes can, if they do take place, happen at any point in time during the
interval [ t, t + ∆t ]. The hazard rate hi(t), i.e. the probability that an event yi will occur at some
point given that the event has not previously taken place, is given as,
(2) hi(t) = lim   Pr [ t  ≤ T ≤ t + ∆t | T ≥ t ] / ∆t i = 0, 1
∆t→0
What factors explain the probability that a company over a period of time will make
some change to how it operates in a foreign market? Previous literature, although relatively
scarce, has suggested several variables – or covariates – that are likely to have an impact on
such decisions. Some of these covariates are structural. They relate to unchanging
characteristics of the individual cases (for example, the foreign market in question). They can
also describe a particular feature of a case at the point t, when it becomes at risk of an event y:
for example, the extent to which an exporter was satisfied with its sales in a particular foreign
market. In contrast to structural variables whose values do not change over the observation
period, other variables relate to phenomena that are likely to change over time (time-varying
covariates). For example, in a given foreign market demand-related factors such as the size of
the market and the purchasing power of consumers in that market will most likely change
over the years.
Letting Xt denote the set of structural variables at time t, and Zt + ∆t the set of time-
varying covariates, respectively, a simple model of export channel dynamics can be
formulated as:
(3) hi(t) = h [ Xt  , Zt + ∆t  ] i = 0, 1
The various covariates are described and discussed in the next section.
III. Determinants of export channel dynamics
Previous studies on various aspects of export channel dynamics have pointed out that
changes in the way exporters organize their sales activities in foreign markets largely depend
on two sets of factors: switch motivators and switch deterrents (Benito et al., 1999).
The two types of factors work in opposite directions. Motivators are factors that to
some extent negatively change the perceived utility of continuing with the current set-up
regarding foreign sales, and which therefore should increase the probability of making
alterations to the current organization of export sales. In contrast, switch deterrents are a set of
factors that make it difficult or costly (these factors have hence also been labeled switching
costs) to actually carry out such changes.
5Earlier studies of export channel dynamics suggest that important switching
motivators are: i) the exporter’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the current
intermediary; ii) the exporter’s accumulation of market knowledge; iii) export market growth;
and iv) growth of the exporting company. First, a number of studies report that exporters’
perception of poor performance of the intermediary over a prolonged period is a fundamental
reason for change (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1990; Calof and Beamish, 1995). Second, the
gradual accumulation of market knowledge should work as a switch motivator. Increased
market knowledge reduces uncertainty and may make high-commitment investments in a
foreign market appear less risky (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The accumulation of market
knowledge may also prompt an exporting firm to consider replacement of its local
representative by a new one. As the exporting firm gets more knowledgeable about the
foreign market it may spot other local intermediaries that appear to be more skillful and
enthusiastic (Petersen et al, 1999). This is in particular likely if the selection process leading
to the appointment of the first intermediary has been a haphazard one. Third, export market
growth is an indication of the expected sales volume in the foreign market in question, and it
has been shown to be an important discriminating factor in the choice of distribution channels
in foreign markets (Klein, Frazier and Roth, 1990). Because a sales subsidiary entails higher
fixed costs for the exporter than using an intermediary, it can only be justified if sales volume
is sufficiently large (Buckley and Casson, 1981). Finally, as an exporting company grows it
will gain more financial and managerial resources.  This may work in favor of choosing more
high-commitment modes, which can be quite resource demanding both in terms of financial
means and managerial capacity (Penrose, 1956; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988).
The various switching motivators point toward a change of the current foreign
intermediary, although the firm has two alternative change options: either switching to
another foreign intermediary or to an in-house operation. The two alternatives differ with
respect to risk, commitment and required resources. Different switching motivators should be
expected therefore to determine whether an exporting company just makes a shift of foreign
intermediary or whether the operation mode itself is changed. In the former case, one would
expect the motivation for changing to be very much related to dissatisfaction with the current
intermediary, but not necessarily with other changes in internal and external conditions. In the
latter case, the switching motivators should be expected to be a broader range of changes in
conditions (including deteriorating satisfaction with the intermediary). Thus, while the
companies may choose only to replace their foreign partner in the former case, it seems
probable that they would go further and switch even the operation mode itself in the latter
case. Accordingly, we expect that exporters’ dissatisfaction with their current intermediaries
will be positively correlated with switching to another intermediary as well as with switching
to an in-house operation.
Hence, we expect replacements of an intermediary not to be correlated with any
switching motivators other than dissatisfaction with the intermediary and accumulation of
market knowledge. With regard to switching to in-house operations we predict that such
switches are influenced by two additional switch motivators: export market growth, and
company growth.
In our model, “the flip side of the coin” consist of a range of the switching deterrents,
i.e. factors that hinder or make it costly to make changes in the distribution channel.
According to Pedersen et al. (1997), important switching deterrents are; i) contractual
restrictions, ii) loss of local sales revenue, iii) recruitment and training costs, and iv) foreign
operation learning costs (see Benito et al. (1999) for an in-depth discussion of switching
costs). The impact of switching costs may, again, differ depending on what type of switch a
firm makes. On one hand, contractual restrictions as well as potential losses of sales revenue
6are clearly relevant to take into account when considering whether a foreign intermediary
should be replaced. On the other hand, recruitment and training costs as well as foreign
operation learning costs pertain clearly only to establishing a foreign sales subsidiary. As a
consequence, such costs should only affect the decision to switch from an intermediary to
using an in-house sales-force.
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses regarding the expected effects of the various
switching motivators and switching deterrents on the choice of distribution channel.
-------------------------
Table 1 about here
-------------------------
IV. Methodology and data
In order to test the hypotheses, we use data on foreign distribution channels measured at two
different points in time, 1992 and 1997. Also, the analysis is based on data covering actual
switches.
Data were collected in two steps. The first step was to collect data about the actual
foreign distribution channel on the particular foreign markets, and to map the respondents'
perception regarding various issues related to the possibilities and problems of switching
operation mode. The collection of these ”pre-switch” data was conducted in 1992. The next
step was taken in 1997, when data was obtained about the occurrence of switches of foreign
operation method. The ”post-switch” data basically consist of information on changes, if any,
in the distribution channel on the particular markets since 1992 and the exact year in which an
eventual switch took place.
Step One: The Pre-Switch Data
Data were collected in a survey of Danish manufacturing companies with export activities.
Companies that in 1992 had only quite limited experience with exports (i.e. they exported to
neighbouring countries only) or had equity below 15,000 US$, were excluded from the
sampling frame. After exclusion of these small and inexperienced exporters, a total population
of 1,365 companies appeared. In 1992, the identified export managers, or - as a second choice
- managing directors, of all companies in this population received a detailed, mailed
questionnaire. Prior to distribution, the questionnaire had been tested in two rounds - with an
intermediary revision - on the export managers of two companies. Before answering the thirty
questions included in the questionnaire, the companies were asked to select one export market
where the export market had been served by an independent intermediary over a continuous
period of at least one year. In those cases where several export markets fulfilled the criteria,
the respondents were asked to choose the market representing the largest sales potential (see
Petersen, 1996, for a more detailed discussion of the selection criteria). Usable replies from
349 companies where received2.
Step Two: The Post-Switch Data
                                                          
2 The data base of the 349 Danish exporting firms includes basic information (such as total sales, number of
employees, and industry), as well as more specific data on the activities on the particular foreign market where
the exporter was represented by an independent intermediary. Included were data on the relationship between the
Danish exporter and the foreign intermediary (such as the type of contract, remuneration, and termination rules),
and a range of questions about the Danish exporter’s perception of the foreign market (for example, competition,
and sales potential) and the effort of the foreign intermediary.
7In 1997, the 349 companies were again contacted for a telephone interview on possible
changes since 1992 in the operation mode on the particular foreign market. Most of the
interviewed persons were export managers responsible for the activities on the particular
market. The aim of the interviews was to check whether the Danish exporter still served in
1997 the foreign market via an independent intermediary, or whether it had changed the entry
mode on the particular market. In case they had changed the entry mode, we asked the
respondents to list all changes of operation mode on the market from 1992 to 1997. For
various reasons we had to exclude 60 companies from the initial sample of 349 companies.
The final sample consists therefore of 276 companies3.
Entry Mode Shifts in the Final Sample from 1992 to 1997
The data provides interesting information about the frequency of switches of operation mode:
182 companies, or two thirds of the companies, were served by the same intermediary in 1997
as they were in 1992. However, the remaining 94 companies had made some kind of change
since 1992 in how they served the particular market. Of these, 48 companies had shifted to a
new intermediary or established their own sales organization alongside the existing
independent intermediary in the foreign market (”dual distribution”).
Operation mode switches were implemented by 36 companies. Nearly all of these
switches were from an independent intermediary to own sales organization (i.e. sales
subsidiary, local sales office, or home-based salesforce), thereby ”internalizing” the sales and
marketing activities in the foreign market. Moreover, an additional 10 companies indicated
that they intended to switch their entry mode in the near future.
All in all, during the last five years 17 per cent of the companies (46 companies) had
switched, or were soon to switch, their entry mode in the particular market, and a further 17
per cent of the companies (48 companies) had shifted to a new partner (intermediary) or
established dual distribution. The data hence show that changes in entry mode and shifts of
foreign partner are far from infrequent occurrences.
-------------------------
Table 2 about here
-------------------------
In the present analysis, we have excluded those companies that had made only minor changes
(i.e. no switch of intermediary but established “dual distribution”) or had just intentions to do
so. As shown in table 2, this gives us a total of 260 companies split into two consistent
groups: 182 companies without any shifts, 42 companies have switched foreign intermediary,
and 36 companies with a complete switch to an in-house operation. However, due to missing
values, 6 cases had to be excluded from the statistical analysis, hence bringing the number of
observations down to 254.
Operationalization
While most of the variables are structural variables (Xt) that remain constant during the
observed time period, two of the variables should measured as time varying covariates (Zt + ∆t)
                                                          
3 23 of the Danish exporters had been liquidated or merged into another since 1992, and in 15 cases sales to the
particular market had ceased. In 22 cases we had no information about which market the original questionnaire
covered, which made it impossible to check changes of market servicing method. The corrected sample was then
289 companies. Among these companies only 7 companies refused to answer, but in 6 other companies we could
not get in touch with the right person.
8that allow for changing conditions during the observed time period. These two variables are
growth of the export market and growth of the exporting company.
Our first set of variables are the various switching motivators (M). The variable
”Dissatisfaction with intermediary” was constructed on the basis of three items. The
companies were asked three questions: How does the company perceive the success of the
intermediary in terms of i) market penetration, ii) profitability of export, and iii) the effort
made? All three items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. The three items were then
added to one single variable. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this variable is 0.83.
Following other studies on firms' internationalization process (Welch and
Luostarinen, 1988), the time spent in a particular foreign market was used as a proxy for
”accumulation of market knowledge”. This variable was measured as the number of years
since the company made the first agreement with the particular foreign intermediary. This
variable was entered in logarithmic form in order to capture the decreasing rate of knowledge
accumulation.
The two variables ”growth of market” and ”growth of company” were both based on
secondary data. The yearly growth rate of GDP in the foreign market was used as a proxy for
market growth. Clearly, this is a rough proxy covering the general development in the foreign
country, and not the growth in the market of the particular product per se. Unfortunately, it
was not possible to get a more disaggregated, and hence better, measure of market growth.
The growth of the company was measured in terms of employment growth. Both growth
variables were measured in each year from 1990 to 1995. A lagged specification (one year
lag) was used because it is reasonable to expect a certain time lag until changes in the growth
rates affect decisions on foreign operation method.
Out second set of variables comprise the various switch deterrents (D). ”Contractual
restrictions” were measured straightforward as the period of time the intermediary should be
notified in advance in case of termination of the agreement. Whether the foreign intermediary
was taking care of after-sales activities was used a as proxy for ”loss of sales revenue”.
Following Heide and John (1988), the argument is that the more service the foreign
intermediary is offering the customers, the more the customers are loyal to the intermediary,
and as a result, the larger the loss of sales revenue in case of termination.
Like in the Weiss and Anderson's (1992) study, the companies were asked directly
about their assessments of the ”potential costs of hiring, recruiting and training” their own
sales force for the foreign market. The share of total turnover originating from the Danish
home market was used as a proxy for (lack of) ”international experience”.
In addition to the aforementioned variables, we included two control variables (C) in
our empirical model: (1) monitoring capabilities and (2) cultural distance to the foreign
market in question. The control variables were measured as follows. In order to capture
“monitoring problems” respondents were asked to assess the extent to which their companies
found it difficult to control the effort of their foreign agents (a 7-point Likert scale was used).
The Kogut-Singh index (Kogut and Singh, 1988) was used to measure cultural distance. The
Kogut-Singh index is a composite index based on Hofstede’s (1983) four cultural dimensions
(power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, and masculinity-
femininity), and gives a metric for the cultural distance between Denmark and the various
foreign markets. The operationalization of the explanatory variables is summarized in Table
3.
-------------------------
Table 3 about here
-------------------------
9Model Specification and Estimation Results
Based on our conceptual framework, changes in the organization of foreign distribution are a
function of following sets of factors;
(4) yi  =  f [ Xt M, Xt D, Xt C , Z Mt + ∆ ] i = 0, 1
where, Xt M is the vector of structural switching motivators, Z Mt + ∆ is the set of time-varying
switching motivators, Xt D denotes the vector of switching deterrents, and Xt C represents the
two control variables.
Because some of our independent variables are time-varying covariates and some of
our observations are right-censored, we use Cox’s partial likelihood technique to estimate our
model (Cox, 1972). This technique was designed for longitudinal data on the occurrence of
events where an event is defined as a qualitative change that can be situated in time; in this
case, the events yi  are changes in foreign distribution channels. It uses the dependent variable
(i.e. the time when the event(s) took place) and information on whether it has been censored
to construct the hazard rate h(t), which indicates the probability that an event will occur at a
given time, conditioned that the event had not taken place up to that time. Our empirical
model is,
(5) hi(t) = h0(t) exp [βXt M, βXt D, βXt C, βZ Mt + ∆ ] i = 0, 1
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, and the βs denote the vectors of regression
parameters associated with the explanatory variables. The coefficient estimates in this model
test whether the independent variables increase or decrease the hazard rate that a particular
event will occur (i.e. that a company will make some kind of switch in the distribution
channel). The advantage of Cox’s partial likelihood technique is that we do not need to
specify the form of the underlying hazard distribution. Moreover, in according to our
discussion in section II, we are able to run a competing risk model where companies that have
already made one switch (either to another intermediary or to an in-house operation) no
longer run the risk of another switch. This is particularly relevant in this case where the two
methods of switching operation method are mutually exclusive. We estimate these models
using PROC PHREG in SAS (1991) which is often referred to as a “proportional hazard
regression model”.
An alternative statistical technique we could use is the multinominal logit regression
model. However, the proportional hazard model has several advantages compared to the
multinominal logit model in our case; principally, that we can include time varying covariates
and run a competing risk model. Both these features of the hazard model emphasize the
dynamic aspects of our model that provide a better reflection of the actual dynamics of
channel decisions in foreign markets.
Table 4 shows the results of the model estimations. The first model (column 1),
labeled “Any Switch”, analyses the factors that influence a switch to either another
intermediary or an in-house operation. This model is run mainly for comparison purposes.
Because we hypothesize that the factors that lead to shift of the intermediary differ
from those that cause switch to own in-house operation, and because we treat the two events
as mutually exclusive, we run a competing risk model which makes a simultaneous estimation
of the determinants of both the two possible events. The first run of the competing risk model,
labeled “Switch to Another Intermediary” (column 2), reports the determinants of the
probability that a company will shift the intermediary, while treating switch to own in-house
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operation as censored at occurrence. The second run of the competing risk model, labeled
“Switch to In-house Operation” (column 3), looks at the determinants of internalizing the
foreign operation, treating shift of intermediary as censored.
The Chi-square coefficient associated with each model expresses the probability that
the configuration represented by the whole model could have been obtained randomly. The
competing risk model for switch to another intermediary (column 2) has a probability of 0.07,
which means that the probability that our prediction will be generated by pure chance is
slightly over the five percent. The competing risk model for switch to own in-house operation
(column 3) has a better fit, with a probability of less than 0.004 that this model could have
been obtained by chance. The model for any switch (column 1) has an excellent fit with a chi-
square of 27.8 (10 d.f.). The probability that such a configuration will happen by chance is
less than 0.002.
The results of the competing risk models confirm that analyzing separately shift of
intermediary and switch to in-house operation improves our ability to explain switches, as the
sum of the chi-squares of the competing risk models (χ22 + χ23 = 42.7) is significantly higher
than that of the model for any switch (χ21 = 27.8). The improvement of 14.9 is statistically
significant after controlling for the increase in the number of parameters. This is also reflected
in the coefficients with some parameters being significant in one run, but not in the other.
-------------------------
Table 4 about here
-------------------------
V. Results and discussion
Apparently, the prediction of mode shifts is to be found in an interplay between, on the one
hand, changes of organizational and environmental conditions that act as switching
motivators, and, on the other hand, the switching costs associated with a shift. As such, the
mode shift decision seems to implicate a cost-benefit analysis. However, the elements of
switching motivators and switching deterrents are affecting the choice of either switching to
another foreign intermediary or an in-house operation in different ways.
The only switching motivator that affects the choice of switching to another
intermediary is dissatisfaction with the current intermediary. The coefficient of 0.35 is highly
significant (p < 0.03). None of the other switching motivators seems to have any significant
effect on the shift of intermediary, including accumulation of market knowledge.
This is in contrast to the switch to own in-house operation where three of the four
switching motivators turn out to be significantly and positively correlated. However, the are
all moderately significant with coefficients of 0.36 (p < 0.06), 0.03 (p < 0.08) and 0.08 (p <
0.09), respectively.
Among the switching deterrents there is only one significant coefficient for the shift
of intermediary; “contractual restrictions” which, as expected, is significant with a negative
coefficient of –0.91 (p < 0.05). None of the other switching deterrents seem to have any
significant influence on the shift of intermediary. Counter to our expectation, anticipated loss
of local sales revenue did not significantly impede the exporters’ replacement of local
intermediaries, but did deter switch of entry mode. A possible explanation is that an important
reason for exporters to replace local intermediaries is the poor sales performance of the latter.
Having generated only limited sales in the foreign market the potential loss of customers
caused by a termination of the intermediary will, accordingly, have insignificant economic
consequences. The situation may very well be quite different when the switch is from an
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intermediary to own sales organization: the internalization could then be a result of the large
sales volume achieved in the local market. It is unlikely that an exporting firm will venture
into an in-house arrangement (such as a sales subsidiary) unless a substantial sales volume has
been generated by the local intermediary. Since the establishment of a sales subsidiary incurs
considerable fixed costs the exporting firm will be more vulnerable to (and alert about) loss of
sales revenue.
For the switch to in-house operation the most important switching deterrent turns out
to be “recruitment and training costs”, which is highly significant with a negative coefficient
of –0.46 (p < 0.001), while “loss of sales revenue” is moderate significant with a coefficient
of –0.76 (p < 0.08). Moreover, cultural distance also seems to affect switches: increased
cultural distance decreases the probability to switch to an in-house operation.
VI. Conclusion and suggestions for further research
Overall, this study clearly demonstrates the dynamic nature of the organization of export
activities. Using data from a sample of Danish exporting companies, this study finds that
within the observed five-year period almost one third of the exporters completed some kind of
shift away from using the current independent intermediary. The analysis suggests that the
choices of switching to another intermediary and to own in-house operation are driven by
different factors. The main reason for the shift of intermediary is the perceived dissatisfaction
with the performance of the current intermediary, while the main obstacles for such changes
are contractual restrictions like termination clauses in the contract with the current
intermediary. These results indicate that the factors influencing the choice of shift of
intermediary is rather straightforward, and largely in accordance with previous studies of
export channel dynamics.
With regard to the switch from independent intermediary to in-house operation a
larger set of factors seems to influence such decisions. The main reasons for making such
changes are 1) dissatisfaction with the intermediary’s performance, 2) an increased level of
foreign experience which in turn makes companies more willing and prepared to make
commitments in a foreign market, and 3) high export market growth indicating a larger future
sales potential. The main deterrents for making the change to own in-house operations are 1)
perceived recruitment and training costs when establishing the foreign operation, and 2) the
fear of loss of local sales revenue in case of a switch away from the current intermediary.
Being among the first to investigate foreign distribution channel decisions in a
longitudinal perspective, this study has an exploratory character and the results should
therefore be regarded as tentative. While several limitations should be noted, the very same
limitations open interesting avenues for future research. First, although the reasoning
underlying the framework presented here was by and large supported by the empirical
analysis, some hypotheses failed to receive statistical support. Somewhat crude measurements
may have had some part in this. In particular, GNP and growth in GNP are rather imprecise
proxies for market size and market growth, and efforts should be made in future studies to
collect data on more disaggregated levels. Also, multi-item measures on multifaceted
variables such as accumulation of market knowledge would increase measurement reliability.
Second, the findings presented here pertain to the behavior of a particular sample of Danish
exporters, and future studies should examine to what extent our findings can be generalized to
other empirical settings.           
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Table 1. Expected effects of the independent variables on the choice of distribution channel.
Independent variables
Switch to another
intermediary
Switch to an
in-house operation
Dissatisfaction with the current
intermediary
+ +
Accumulation of market knowledge + +
Export market growth No effect +
Switching
Motivators
Growth of the exporting company No effect +
Contractual restrictions - -
Loss of local sales revenue - -
Recruitment and training costs No effect -
Switching
Deterrents
Foreign operation learning costs No effect -
Table 2. Changes of foreign market servicing method from 1992 to 1997.
Categories No. of cases
a. No major change in foreign distribution since 1992 182
b. Had replaced the intermediary 42
c. Had switched entry mode since 1992      
36
Total 260
15
Table 3. Description of independent variables and data sources.
Variable Measurement Data source*
Switching motivators
1. Diminishing
satisfaction
How does the company perceive the succes of the
intermediary in terms of i) market penetration, ii)
profitability of export and iii) the effort made? (Likert-
scale: 1 = very satisfactory, 7 = very dissatisfactory)
Questionnaire
2. Accumulation of
market knowledge
Log of number of years since the company made the first
agreement with a foreign intermediary in the market
Interview
3. Growth of market Growth in GDP at constant prices from 1990 to 1995 in
the particular market
World Marketing Data
and Statistics 1997
4. Growth of company Growth in employment from 1990 to 1995 (in 100) CD-Direct’s database
on Danish companies
Switching costs
5. Contractual
restrictions
The period of time the intermediary should be notified in
advance in case of termination of the agreement
Questionnaire
6. Loss of sales
revenue
Is the foreign intermediary taking care of after-sales
activities? (dummy: 0 = yes, 1 = no)
Questionnaire
7. Recruitment and
training costs
What would be the costs if the company had to recrute
and train its own sales force for the particular market?
(Likert-scale: 1 = expecting minimal costs, 7 = expecting
huge costs)
Questionnaire/
Interview
8. International
experience
The share of total turnover sold on the Danish home
market
CD-Direct’s database
on Danish companies
Control variables
9. Monitoring problems How difficult is it to monitor the effort of the
intermediary? (Likert-scale: 1 = rather simple, 7 = very
difficult)
Questionnaire
10. Cultural distance Kogut-Singh index Own calculations
based on questionnaire
data
Note: *  The questionnaire data were collected in 1992 and the (telephone) interviews were conducted in 1997.
Table 4. Overall model results: Cox-models.
Independent variables
(1)
Any switch
(2)
Switch to another
intermediary
(3)
Switch to an in-
house operation
Dissatisfaction with the current
intermediary
0.36*** 0.35** 0.36*
Accumulation of market knowledge 0.03** 0.02 0.03*
Export market growth 0.05 0.01 0.08*
Growth of the exporting company -0.03 -0.22 0.04
Contractual restrictions -0.91** -0.91** -0.76
Loss of local sales revenue -0.16 0.61 -0.76*
Recruitment and training costs -0.22** 0.02 -0.46***
Foreign operation learning costs -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Monitoring capability 0.18* 0.18 0.19
Cultural distance -0.13 -0.06 -0.21*
No. of observations
Percent censored
-2 log L (Chi-square)
254
78.7
27.8*** (10 d.f.)
254
89.0
16.9* (10 d.f.)
254
89.8
25.8*** (10 d.f.)
Note: ***, **, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).
